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One of the central strengths of Salem’s analysis of Nasserism is that she recognizes 
both its world-historical significance as a progressive nationalist movement, and its 
severe limitations. In the first section of this paper, I discuss Salem’s notion of the 
"afterlives" of the Nasserist project by drawing attention to one of the most debili-
tating legacies of that project, namely the transformation of Egyptian politics into 
petty bourgeois politics. In the second section, I argue that while Salem does not 
explicitly draw on Hegel’s understanding of tragedy in her account of Nasserism, 
her analysis of Nasserism essentially amounts to depicting it as a Hegelian tragedy. 
By placing Salem’s book in conversation with Hegel (and his philosophy of action), 
we can make explicit what I take to be one of the central claims made by Salem, 
namely that when passing judgment on past and present national liberation move-
ments we should remember that innocence is "only non-action, like the mere being 
of a stone" [nur das Nichttun wie das Sein eines Steines] (Hegel 1986, 346). In the 
third section of this paper, I raise some critical points about Salem’s characterization 
of the nationalism that was associated with the Nasserist project, as well as about 
the deployment of the concept of modernity in her analysis. I argue that her account 
of modernity in the book does not distinguish between the concept of modernity as 
it refers to a certain kind of normative philosophical discourse, and modernization 
theory qua theory of development. Finally, I draw on Salem’s use of the concept of 
hegemony in order to pose a question regarding the political significance of the con-
temporary cultural hegemony of Islamist movements in Egypt.
Nostalgia and the afterlives of petty bourgeois politics
Salem argues that the Nasserist project was the only truly hegemonic project in 
Egypt’s modern history. Salem convincingly argues that the hegemony of the Nas-
serist project could not have been built by "repeating empty rhetorical slogans year 
after year" (Salem, 135). Instead, it appealed to many Egyptians from different 
social classes because it drew on ideas that were already held by them, such as the 
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importance of national sovereignty, the creation of a social welfare state, and devel-
opment through industrialization. In other words, workers were not "duped" by the 
proponents of the Nasserist project, they agreed with some of the aims of that pro-
ject, and they benefitted materially from the implementation of that project.1 The 
mechanism by means of which Nasserism was able to accomplish this is interest-
ing because it illustrates both the world-historical significance of the national libera-
tion movements which were led by the petite bourgeoisie and their structural limi-
tations. Salem points out that the Nasserist project succeeded because its political 
tenets were not entirely new (Salem, 132). It drew on ideas and goals that had been 
elaborated in the decades before 1952 by working-class movements and feminist 
movements. However, while this project actualized some of the ideas of working-
class movements, it disempowered their independent organizations. The same is also 
true of Nasserism’s relationship with feminist movements, e.g., while attempts were 
made to allow women to move from the sphere of social reproduction to the (public) 
"sphere of production", independent organizations such as the Egyptian Feminist 
Union were shut down. Salem argues that this approach prevented successful chal-
lenges to the emergence of Sadat’s dependent bourgeoisie (Salem, 260).
I would also add that the most damaging limitation of Nasserism is that it eventu-
ally led to the disfiguration of Egyptian politics and to its transformation into mid-
dle-class politics(Batatu 1983, 16).By this I mean that Nasserism empowered the 
petite bourgeoisie to define political discourse and practice in Egypt (a trend which 
continues today). While it is to true that Nasserism appealed to many classes, its 
primary constituency was the class of bureaucrats and technocrats who now had a 
path towards social mobility through educational reforms and through the expansion 
of the public sector. In other words, if we agree with Salem that Nasserism has over-
shadowed all subsequent Egyptian history (Salem, 147), then we should also point 
out that it has constrained Egyptian politics within the framework of petty bourgeois 
politics (Amin, 1978, 65).
One of the lingering shadows of the "afterlives" of Nasserism is that many of 
those who attempted to struggle against the Infitah project under Sadat as well as 
the acceleration of neoliberalization during the 1990s and 2000s have been unable 
to articulate an alternative vision of Egypt that is not reducible to nostalgia. Vacil-
lation and nostalgia are characteristics of petty bourgeois politics,2 and it would not 
be inaccurate to say that they are the dominant modes of politics in Egypt today. 
The petite bourgeoisie’s vacillation is the outcome of its class position; it is both 
subjected to pressures from the bourgeoisie and yet it fears any political movement 
that is led by the working-class. Its nostalgia is the product of the recognition that 
if current socioeconomic trends continue into the future, the petite-bourgeoisie will 
1 The invaluable oral history which has been compiled by Abu Al-Leil (2015) also supports Salem’s 
point.
2 As Marx and Engels note, the petite bourgeoisie is always "fluctuating between proletariat and bour-
geoisie, ever renewing itself as a supplementary part of bourgeois society" (Marx and Engels 2007, 34).
International Politics Reviews 
cease to exist as a class (by being pushed down into the working-class).3 Hence, this 
class can imagine itself as having a future only if history can somehow be made to 
go backwards in time.
Today, we see this nostalgia at work on both the right and the left in Egypt. On the 
right, we see pro-monarchist propaganda which falsely paints the pre-1952 period as 
modern Egypt’s "golden age". On the left, we see Nasserists uncritically harkening 
back to the 1950s and 1960s, and blaming individual traitors for the collapse of the 
Nasserist project.4 This moralizing nostalgia, which is incapable of accommodating 
any kind of structural analysis, is a debilitating feature of contemporary Egyptian 
political challenges to the neo-liberal restructuring of Egypt. Nostalgia is also essen-
tial to the discourse of Islamist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood (in this case 
nostalgia for a unified and powerful Muslim ummah).It is therefore no exaggeration 
to say that, in Egypt, the past "weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living" 
(Marx 1996, 32).
If examine the social base of the Muslim Brotherhood, we find that, while its 
leading figures are merchants like Khairat al-Shater who have benefitted from the 
Infitah(Salem, 185–191), the cadres of the party are primarily from the petite bour-
geoisie (Ismail 2020). It is worth pondering why the class which benefitted the most 
from the Nasserist project was the class that also threw its weight behind the Islam-
ist movements which contributed to the dismantling of that very same project, and 
then proceeded to dance on its grave. This might be taken as evidence that to build 
a political project with the petite bourgeoisie as a social base is to build on weak, 
unstable foundations. It may in fact be the case that the cultural hegemony of Islam-
ism in contemporary Egypt is but a manifestation in the cultural sphere of the domi-
nance of the petite bourgeoisie over the Egyptian political imaginary.
This is not to say that there is no significant difference between petty bourgeois 
political discourse that is carried out with the aim of breaking with dependency, 
and petty bourgeois political discourse that is carried out with the aim of fostering 
dependency. Nasser’s political discourse, despite its many limitations, was funda-
mentally anti-imperialist and directed against dependency, whereas Sadat was una-
bashedly in favor of subordinating Egypt to US imperialism. Nonetheless, the fact 
remains that the former was afflicted with structural limitations, which placed it in 
a position of vulnerability in relation to the latter. Such structural limitations were 
evident in the aftermath of the 1967 defeat which effectively brought about the end 
of the Nasserist project. In the aftermath of defeat there were repeated calls for the 
launching of a "people’s war" to liberate the occupied lands, i.e., a war that would 
both presuppose progressive social changes and help catalyze them, yet such calls 
3 This is the real import of the frequent laments that are heard in Egypt today about the "decline of the 
middle class".
4 Sadat may have been a traitor, but Sadat is also what you get when you try to build "socialism without 
socialists".
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were ultimately ignored in favor of an attempt to preserve a national independence 
project that was led by the petite bourgeoisie (Sharawy 2019, 222–224).5
Amílcar Cabral argued that the petite bourgeoisie leading the struggle against 
colonialism could take one of two paths. The first path, the one taken by most petty 
bourgeois national movements, involves preventing the peasantry and the working-
class from developing autonomous movements and organizations, in which case the 
petite bourgeoisie would "transform itself into a national pseudo-bourgeoisie, that 
is to deny the revolution and necessarily subject itself to imperialist capital"(Cabral 
1979, 136). The other path, which was taken by few movements, involves allowing 
the working-class and the peasantry to direct the struggle, which requires that  the 
petite bourgeoisie in power should "commit suicide as a class" (Cabral 1979, 136).6 
In the aftermath of 1967, the petty bourgeois officers, technocrats, and bureaucrats 
were called upon to commit class suicide in the Cabralian sense, and they ultimately 
failed to do so.
Nonetheless, Cabral’s analysis is not without its problems. A key problem with 
Cabral’s call for the petite bourgeoisie leading national liberation struggles to com-
mit class suicide is that it requires that the petite bourgeoisie should, on the one 
hand, trust itself insofar as it is required to play an indispensable role in the national 
liberation struggle. On the other hand, it requires that the petite bourgeoisie should 
develop an awareness of its own weakness, and that it should fundamentally dis-
trust itself. For it must keep in view the fact that without allowing the peasantry 
and the working class to direct the struggle (which requires that they be allowed 
to develop autonomous organizations), the petite bourgeoisie is always susceptible 
to becoming transformed into a "national pseudo-bourgeoisie". From the standpoint 
of logical analysis, there is no contradiction in what Cabral demands; but from a 
praxis-oriented standpoint (which must account for empirically given psychologi-
cal profiles), it is difficult to see how one can simultaneously act on both beliefs in 
a sustained manner. We may ask: Could the officers involved in the Nasserist pro-
ject have accomplished what they did (and they did accomplish much), if they did 
not harbor illusions about the ability of the petite bourgeoisie to arrest its inevita-
ble slide towards surrender and dependency? In other words, Nasserism might have 
been based on an illusion, but perhaps this illusion was historically necessary.
The Nasserist project as Hegelian tragedy
Unlike many one-sided discussions of Nasserism, Salem’s book is sensitive to both 
the accomplishments of the Nasserist project and the sacrifices that it demanded. 
This is brought out in her analysis of the construction of the Aswan High Dam, 
5 In the aftermath of 1967, there were also calls by the Marxist writers around al-Tali’a for Egypt to fol-
low the Cuban model (Gervasio 2010, 232).
6 Cuba is an example of this second path. Maybe Nasserists would do well to study Cuba, since undoubt-
edly there were "Sadats" in Cuba (for surely, they exist everywhere), but unlike in Egypt, they have never 
been able to obtain state power.
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which was seen as a necessary step for Egypt’s modernization, but whose construc-
tion led to the displacement of Nubians in Upper Egypt and Wadi Halfa in Northern 
Sudan as well as to the death of some of the workers involved in the project (Salem, 
270–271).7 The need to erect the dam in order to provide electricity to power the 
import-substitution industrialization program clashed with the demands of Nubians 
to not be displaced from their ancestral lands. Salem’s sensitivity to both the vio-
lence that accompanied the Nasserist national liberation project and to the historical 
significance of that project as an attempt to break with dependency is a key strand 
in the book. Salem is critical of the Nasserist project, but her critique takes into 
account the historical constraints within which that project unfolded. Hence, it is 
not a critique from the romantic standpoint of what Hegel calls "the beautiful soul" 
(which is analyzed below).
I argue that while Salem does not explicitly draw on Hegel’s understanding of 
tragedy in her account of Nasserism, her analysis of Nasserism essentially amounts 
to depicting it as a Hegelian tragedy. As Mark W. Roche notes, "For Hegel tragedy 
is the conflict of two substantive positions, each of which is justified, yet each of 
which is wrong to the extent that it fails either to recognize the validity of the other 
position or to grant it its moment of truth" (Roche 2006, 12). In other words, what 
was tragic about the Nasserist project is that many of its internal conflicts pitted 
right against right.8It seems to me that this reading accords with Salem’s insistence 
that the failures of the Nasserist project (and other equivalent anticolonial projects) 
cannot be solely blamed on inadequate decision-making processes (Salem, 278). 
However, this is not to say that guilt is absent here. What is especially interesting 
about employing a Hegelian conception of tragedy to analyze the Nasserist project 
is that it brings to the fore the question of whether anti-colonial projects had to be 
"one-sided" in order to be efficacious. According to at least one reading of Hegel, all 
efficacious action in the world is of necessity one-sided—those who engage in it can 
only do so by marginalizing principles that have an equally valid normative claim 
upon them (Oudemans and Lardinois 1987, 114–115). If this framing is appropri-
ate, then we can say that the proponents of the Nasserist project were guilty and that 
their guilt was an unavoidable consequence of their (efficacious) struggle against a 
colonial and neo-colonial international order.
Of course, even if Hegel is right and all action involves guilt, it still does not fol-
low that all actors are guilty to the same degree. It only implies that when passing 
judgment on past and present national liberation movements we should remember 
that innocence is "only non-action, like the mere being of a stone" [nur das Nicht-
tun wie das Sein eines Steines] (Hegel 1986, 346). To demand that a group of peo-
ple should undertake any action of world-historical significance while remaining 
entirely innocent is to demand the impossible.
7 We also should not forget that under the monarchy Egyptian Nubia was even more neglected by the 
central government than it is today. For example, in the decades before 1952, there was only one primary 
school in all of Egyptian Nubia (Abu Al-Leil 2015, 160).
8 I emphasize "internal conflicts" because I think that it is obvious that Nasserism’s external conflicts 
with colonialism and neo-colonialism did not instantiate a struggle of "right against right". No right can 
be found on the colonial/neo-colonial side.
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The significance of this point is that it allows us to differentiate between two 
kinds of critiques of the Nasserist project (and of the Bandung-era national libera-
tion movements in general). One kind of critique proceeds by pointing to the pos-
sibilities that were foreclosed by the Nasserist project, while also recognizing that 
at least some of the internal struggles that it engendered were tragic in the Hege-
lian sense insofar as they pitted right against right. I regard this type of critique as 
legitimate and necessary. The second kind of critique proceeds from the detached 
standpoint of what Hegel calls "the beautiful soul" [die schöne Seele] (Hegel, 1986, 
464). The beautiful soul understands that to engage in any action is to risk sullying 
one’s hands, and that maintaining moral purity is incompatible with being an active 
agent in the world. The beautiful soul values moral purity above all else, and hence 
it refuses to act. Yet it does not refrain from passing judgment on those who act: 
"the beautiful soul is the self-righteous critic who is proud of never actually doing 
anything" (Magee 2010, 44). This second type of critique applied to the Nasser-
ist project (and other Bandung-era movements) is harmful because it gives rise to 
unreasonable expectations regarding what a "legitimate" nationalist emancipatory 
movement should look like.9 It essentially amounts to a rejection of any efficacious 
action towards emancipation, since any efficacious action will involve a degree of 
guilt. If I have understood Salem correctly, we are essentially in agreement that the 
standpoint of the "beautiful soul" is not an adequate standpoint from which to criti-
cize Nasserism.
Was the Nasserist project too modernist or not modernist enough?
I now wish to raise three questions in relation to Salem’s book. The first question has 
to do with how we should understand the differences, if there are any, between the 
nationalism espoused by the proponents of anti-colonial projects such as the Nasser-
ist project and the European nationalisms of the nineteenth and twentieth century? 
Salem argues that one of the pitfalls of the Nasserist project is that its leaders did not 
understand that adopting nationalism for more than merely strategic considerations 
was problematic (Salem, 149). The implication here is that at a fundamental level 
"Third World" nationalisms were not really different in kind from the nationalisms 
of colonial countries. However, it is not clear to me that this is true. As I have argued 
elsewhere, there were attempts to rethink nationalism in the post-colonial context 
such as to differentiate it from nationalism as it developed in its nineteenth-century 
European form (El Nabolsy 2020a). Salem does indeed draw on Getachew (2019) 
in order to argue that anticolonial nationalisms were characterized by internation-
alist attempts to remake the world (Salem, 79). However, it is unclear, if, on her 
9 Hegel’s analysis of the beautiful soul can serve as an analysis of "ultra-leftism" and its consequences. 
Readers can decide for themselves whether, for example, much of the contemporary discourse on the left 
around Bolivia’s "exctractivism", under the rule of the Movement for Socialism party, is the product of 
"beautiful souls" in the aforementioned sense.
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account, anticolonial nationalism has any progressive role to play in the world today. 
For what it is worth, I am inclined to think that it does.
The second question has to do with the relationship between the concept of 
modernity and the concept of "coloniality"/colonialism: is modernist discourse 
essentially colonialist in nature? In some parts of the book it seems that the rela-
tionship between the two concepts is not explicitly clarified (Salem, 151–155). My 
inclination is to make a distinction between modernization theory as a discourse of 
development, the philosophical discourse of modernity, and colonialism (and its 
normative justifications). We can point to Cabral as an example of an anti-colonial 
revolutionary who both embraced the philosophical discourse of modernity, while 
also rejecting modernization theory and colonialism—along with its attendant nor-
mative justifications (El Nabolsy 2020b). It seems that when Salem criticizes the 
modernism of the Nasserist project, what she really wants to do is to criticize Nas-
serism’s embrace of some aspects of modernization theory. For example, the extent 
to which modernization theory encouraged industrial development in urban centers 
by means of the exploitation of the countryside.10
Clarification of the relationship between "coloniality" and modernity would also 
refine Salem’s critique of the discourse of "mastery" (Salem, 155). For a funda-
mental commitment of the philosophical discourse of modernity is a commitment 
to autonomy (i.e., that humans cannot be bound by any principles that they do not 
recognize as good—this can also be spelled out in terms of self-legislation).11 The 
relationship between autonomy and mastery needs to be further clarified. Perhaps 
it is true that self-legislation involves a demand for self-mastery, but is this demand 
for self-mastery not different from, for example, the discourse of mastery as applied 
to nature? It seems that we can consistently uphold a demand for self-mastery (as 
required by self-legislation) while rejecting ecologically damaging discourse about 
the mastery of nature. In fact, it may be that the rejection of the latter requires the 
embrace of the former. If this is true, then some kind of discourse invoking mastery 
is desirable.
Drawing attention to the centrality of autonomy in the philosophical discourse 
of modernity also allows us to clarify the nature of Salem’s critique of the Nas-
serist project. If it is indeed true, and Salem seems to suggest as much, that a cen-
tral failing of the Nasserist project is that it undermined the autonomy of individual 
workers, women, peasants, etc., through undermining the development of independ-
ent organizations that allowed for the protection and expression of their individual 
10 The Nasserist government’s policy of holding down food prices meant that the relative prosperity of 
the workers in the large urban centers was coming at the expense of the peasantry (Mansfield, 1969, 
175). However, the Nasserist government seems to have been aware of this, and by 1964 there was an 
attempt to remove all price controls on locally produced food items.
11 This is the kind of freedom that (along with the personal freedom to choose our own ends) Hegel 
took to be distinctive of modernity: "the right to recognize nothing that I do not perceive as rational is 
the highest right of the subject" (Hegel 1991, 159). To use the language of "self-legislation" to describe 
Hegel’s position might be taken to imply that I neglect the differences between Kant and Hegel. How-
ever, it seems clear to me that Hegel does not abandon the modernist Kantian concept of self-legislation, 
but rather he historicizes it. For an overview of interpretive debates regarding this issue, see Stern (2017).
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autonomy,12 then Salem’s critique of the Nasserist project is essentially a critique 
that draws on the philosophical discourse of modernity. Hence, despite appearances, 
and perhaps despite her own intentions, Salem is criticizing the Nasserist project 
for not being modernist enough. Attaining clarity on this point is a desideratum for 
any clear analysis of the Nasserist project. I believe that this point can be general-
ized for the analysis of other Bandung-era projects as well. To criticize Bandung-era 
projects for undermining autonomy means that we are criticizing them on modern-
ist grounds. Therefore, we cannot consistently criticize, on modernist grounds, the 
Bandung-era projects for undermining individual autonomy while also criticizing 
them for being "too modernist". In my view, one of the key failings of the Bandung-
era projects is that they conflated the actualization of the normative principles of 
modernity with modernization theory qua theory of development. It would be unfor-
tunate for critics of the Bandung-era projects to reproduce this same error.
The final question I wish to raise is related to Salem’s use of the concept of 
hegemony. One of Salem’s key theses is that after the collapse of the Nasserist pro-
ject, no other hegemonic project emerged in Egypt, and hence successive regimes 
have had to increasingly rely on coercion without being able to create adequate lev-
els of consent. However, Salem is aware that one objection that can be raised against 
this claim is that since the 1970s and 1980s the Muslim Brotherhood (and Islam-
ist discourse more generally) has managed to become hegemonic. Salem concedes 
that "there is little doubt that specific elements of Brotherhood influence did become 
hegemonic, at least culturally" (Salem, 189). Nonetheless, Salem argues, this cul-
tural hegemony has not been translated into a hegemonic political project. Salem 
explains this by pointing to, among other factors, the fact that the Brotherhood has 
no alternative economic program. They supported Sadat’s Infitah and they supported 
the accelerated neoliberal reforms during the 1990s and 2000s (Salem, 191). One 
question that this analysis raises is the extent to which the "Islamization" of the cul-
tural sphere has essentially led to a situation whereby the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
influence is too weak to create an alternative hegemonic project while at the same 
time remaining too strong to allow for the emergence of a secular, emancipatory 
hegemonic project in Egypt? It seems that without reversing the cultural dominance 
of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups, Egypt will continue to exist 
in what Salem calls "empty time"—a temporal period characterized by the absence 
of any attempt to build a coherent political project that can aspire to become hegem-
onic. We may connect this point to our discussion of the question of modernity. In 
the Egyptian context, it is unclear if a political project that turns its back on moder-
nity (for instance, by equating it with colonialism/coloniality), can offer any kind of 
resistance to the cultural hegemony of Islamist movements. Hence, clarifying what 
modernity means and what a modernist political project should and can look like 
remains a pressing intellectual task.
12 The concept of collective autonomy can be derived from the concept of individual autonomy. Rous-
seau is often identified as a key thinker in the development of the concept of collective autonomy and its 
analogues (Todorov 2009). A point that is also made by C. L. R. James who makes the bold claim that 
“after Karl Marx, Rousseau is the most important figure in modern history” (James 2009, 105).
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